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Abstract
The dynamics of spreading of the minority opinion in public de-
bates (a reform proposal, a behavior change, a military retaliation)
is studied using a diffusion reaction model. People move by discrete
step on a landscape of random geometry shaped by social life (offices,
houses, bars, and restaurants). A perfect world is considered with
no advantage to the minority. A one person-one argument principle
is applied to determine locally individual mind changes. In case of
equality, a collective doubt is evoked which in turn favors the Status
Quo. Starting from a large in favor of the proposal initial majority,
repeated random size local discussions are found to drive the majority
reversal along the minority hostile view. Total opinion refusal is com-
pleted within few days. Recent national collective issues are revisited.
The model may apply to rumor and fear propagation.
PACS numbers: 89.75Hc, 05.50+q, 87.23.G
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All over the world and more specifically in democratic countries public
opinion seems to be rather conservative while facing a nationwide issue open
to a public debate like for instance a reform proposal or a behavior change [1,
2, 3]. Even when the changes at stake are known to be desperately needed
(medical evidences, danger of death, administrative inefficiencies) an initial
hostile minority appears to be almost always able to turn the majority along
its refusal position.
A symptomatic illustration of such a paradoxical social refusal was the
year 2000 generalized failure of the French government to reform the academic
system, the taxes collect and the agriculture system of economical help [3].
Another example is the Irish No to the Nice European treaty that came as
a surprise to the Irish people itself [4]. Along with this reality some people
could be tempted to consider reforms possible only using social violence or
authoritarian top leadership decisions. It thus arises he fundamental question
whether or not a reform can be decided democratically at least in principle.
To understand the reason of such a social inertia, most research has con-
centrated on analyzing the complicated psycho-sociological mechanisms in-
volved in the process of opinion forming. In particular focusing on those
by which a huge majority of people gives up to an initial minority view [1,
2]. The main feature being that the prospect to loose definite advantages
is much more energizing than the hypothetical gain of a reform. Such an
approach is certainly realistic in view of the very active nature of minorities
involved in a large spectrum of situations.
However in this letter we claim that in addition to the more aggressiveness
and persuasive power of a threatened or very motivated minority there exists
some basic and natural mechanism inherent to free public debate which makes
the initial hostile minority to a full spreading over.
To ground our claim we present an extremely simple model to opinion
forming using some concepts and techniques from the physics of disorder [5,
6, 7, 8]. A diffusion reaction model is implemented on a landscape of random
geometry. It does not aimed at an exact description of reality. But rather,
by doing some crude approximations, it focuses on enlightening an essential
feature of an otherwise very complex and multiple phenomena. In particular
the holding of free public debate is shown to lead almost systematically to the
total spreading of an initial hostile minority view within the initial proposal in
favor huge majority. The associated dynamics of extreme public polarization
at the advantage of the initial minority is found to result from the existence
of asymmetric unstable thresholds [9, 10] that are produced by the random
2
occurrence of temporary local doubts. Some recent nation wide issues with
respect to European construction are thus revisited [4, 11]. The application
to the phenomena of rumor and fear propagation is discussed [12].
We start from a population with N individuals, which have to decide
whether or not to accept a reform proposal. At time t prior to the discussion
the proposal has a support byN+(t) individuals leavingN−(t) persons against
it. Each person is supposed to have an opinion making N+(t) +N−(t) = N .
Associated individual probabilities to be in favor or against the proposal are
thus,
P±(t) ≡
N±(t)
N
, (1)
with,
P+(t) + P−(t) = 1. (2)
From this initial configuration, people start discussing the project. How-
ever they don’t meet all the time and all together at once. Gatherings
are shaped by the geometry of social life within physical spaces like offices,
houses, bars and restaurants. This geometry determines the number of peo-
ple, which meet at a given place. Usually it is of the order of just a few.
Groups may be larger but it is much rare. Accordingly a given social life
yields a random local geometry landscape characterized by a probability dis-
tribution for gathering sizes {ai} which satisfy the constraint,
L∑
i=1
ai = 1, (3)
where i = 1, 2, ..., L stands for respective sizes 1, ..., L with L being the
larger group. While discussions can occur by chance, most are monitored
through regular time break meetings like lunch, dinner, happy hour and
late drink. At each encounter people meet with different people (friends,
colleagues and acquaintances) at different areas of their social space. It
extends from a building, a neighborhood, a town or another state. Thus,
people gatherings occur in sequences in time, each one allowing a new local
discussion. There, people may change their mind with respect to the reform
proposal. During these meetings all individuals are assumed to be involved
in one group gathering. It means a given person is, on average, taking part
to a group of size i with probability ai. The existence of one-person groups
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makes this assumption realistic. Each new cycle of multi-size discussions is
marked by a time increment +1.
To emphasize the bare mechanism at work into the refusal dynamics which
arises from local interactions we consider a perfect world. No advantage is
given to the minority with neither lobbying nor organized strategy. More-
over an identical individual persuasive power is assumed for both sides. A
one person - one argument principle is used to implement the psychological
process of collective mind update. On this basis a local majority argument
determines the outcome of the discussion. People align along the local initial
majority view.
For instance a group of five persons with at start three in favor of the
reform and two against it ends up with five people in favor of the reform.
On the reverse two initial reform supporters leads to five persons against it.
However in case of an even group this rule of one person - one argument
leaves the local possibility of a temporary absence of a collective majority.
The group is then at a tie within a non-decisional state. It doubts.
There we evoke a physical principle called the “inertia principle” which
states that to put on motion a system, it is necessary to apply on it a force
at least infinitesimally larger than the friction which holds on it to keep the
system at rest. This principle can be put in parallel to the fundamental
psychological asymmetry that exists between what is known and what is
hypothetical. Therefore, to go along what is unknown, even if this unknown
is supposed to be better, a local majority of at least one voice is necessary.
In terms of our model, at a tie the group does not move and thus decides
not to move, i. e., the full group turns against the reform proposal to preserve
the existing situation. For instance a group of six persons with initially three
in favor of the reform and three against it yields six persons against the
reform. It is worth to stress that this is not an advantage given to the
minority in terms of being more convincing. It is a collective outcome that
results from a state of doubt. For instance dealing with a military retaliation
people will avoid action unless there exist clear evidences for it. Accordingly
having P±(t) at time t yields,
P+(t+ 1) =
L∑
k=1
ak
k∑
j=N [ k
2
+1]
Ckj P+(t)
jP−(t)
(k−j), (4)
at time (t + 1) where Ckj ≡
k!
(k−j)!j! and N [
k
2
+ 1] ≡ IntegerPart of (k
2
+ 1).
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Simultaneously,
P−(t+ 1) =
L∑
k=1
ak
k∑
j=N [ k
2
]
Ckj P−(t)
jP+(t)
(k−j). (5)
In the course of time, the same people will meet again and again randomly
in the same cluster configuration. At each new encounter they discuss locally
the issue at stake and change their mind according to above majority rule.
To follow the time evolution of the reform support Eq. (4) is iterated until a
stable value is reached. A monotonic flow is obtained towards either one of
two stable fixed points P+N = 0 and P+Y = 1. The flow and its direction are
produced by an unstable fixed point P+F located in between P+N and P+Y .
Its value depends on both the {ai} and L. We denote it the Faith point. For
P+(t) < P+F it exists a number n such that P+(t + n) = P+N = 0 while for
P+(t) > P+F it is another numberm which yields P+(t+m) = P+Y = 0. Both
n and m measure the required time at reaching a stable and final opinion.
It is either a “Big Yes” to the reform at P+Y = 1 or a “Big No” at P+N = 0.
Their respective values depend on the {ai}, L and the initial value P+(t) .
Repeated successive local discussions thus drive the whole population to a
full polarization with a “Big Yes” to the reform project at P+Y = 1, or a “Big
No” at P+N = 0. Accordingly, public opinion is not volatile. It stabilizes
rather quickly (n and m are usually small numbers) to a clear stand.
Figure 1 shows the variation of P+(t + 1) as function of P+(t) for two
particular sets of the {ai}. First one is a1 = a2 = a3 = a4 = 0.2 and
a5 = a6 = 0.1 where L = 6. There P+F = 0.74 which puts the required
initial support to the reform success at a very high value of more than 74%.
Simultaneously an initial minority above 26% is enough to produce a final
total refusal. The second set is a1 = 0, a2 = 0.1 and a3 = 0.9 with L = 3 and
P+F = 0.56. There the situation is much milder but also unrealistic since
always pair discussions are much more numerous than just 10%.
To make a quantitative illustration of the dynamics refusal let us consider
above first setting with an initial P+(t) = 0.70 at time t. The associated
series in time is P+(t + 1) = 0.68, P+(t + 2) = 0.66, P+(t + 3) = 0.63,
P+(t + 4) = 0.58, P+(t + 5) = 0.51, P+(t + 6) = 0.41, P+(t + 7) = 0.27,
P+(t+8) = 0.14, P+(t+9) = 0.05, P+(t+10) = 0.01 and eventually P+(t+
11) = 0.00. Eleven cycles of discussion make all 70% of reform supporters
to turn against it by merging with the initial 30% of reform opponents. On
a basis of one discussion a day on average, less than two weeks is enough
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Figure 1: Variation of P+(t+ 1) as function of P+(t). The dashed line is for
the set a1 = a2 = a3 = a4 = 0.2, a5 = a6 = 0.1, L = 6 and P+F = 0.74.
The plain line is for the set a1 = 0, a2 = 0.1 and a3 = 0.9 with L = 3 and
P+F = 0.56. Arrows show the direction of the flow.
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Table 1: Values of the various fixed points for each group size from two to six.
STP ≡ Stable fixed point and UTP ≡ Unstable fixed point
Group SFP UFP SFP
Size Total No P+N Faith Point P+F Total Yes P+Y
2 0 1 none
3 0 1
2
1
4 0 1+
√
13
6
≈ 0.77 1
5 0 1
2
1
6 0 ≈ 0.65 1
to a total crystallization of the No against the reform proposal. Moreover
a majority against the reform is obtained already within six days (see Fig.
(2)).
Changing a bit the parameters with a1 = 0.2, a2 = 0.3, a3 = 0.2, a4 =
0.2, a5 = 0.1 and a6 = 0 gives P+F = 0.85, a higher value, which makes
any reform proposal quite impossible. How a realistic reform project could
start with already more than 85% support in the population? Starting still
from P+(t) = 0.70 yields successively P+(t + 1) = 0.66, P+(t + 2) = 0.60,
P+(t + 3) = 0.52, P+(t + 4) = 0.41, P+(t + 5) = 0.28, P+(t + 6) = 0.15,
P+(t + 7) = 0.05, P+(t + 8) = 0.01 before P+(t + 9) = 0.00. The number
of local meetings has shrieked from 11 to 9. Within ten days the whole
population stands against the reform proposal. The initial 30% of opponents
grow to more than fifty percent in less than four days (see Fig. (2)).
It is the existence of an unstable fixed point between the two stable ones
which produces the whole polarization dynamics. The stable ones are con-
stant and independent of the ai but the unstable one varies with both, sizes
and the ai distribution. To single out the specific contribution of each gath-
ering size to the aggregation effect we now determine the associated unstable
fixed point for groups from two to six. Values are shown in Table 1. The
flow landscape is identical for all odd sizes with an unstable fixed point at 1
2
.
On the opposite for even sizes the unstable fixed point starts at one for size
two and decreases to 0.65 at size six, via 0.77 at size four.
To illustrate the interplay dynamics between even and odd sizes, let us
look at more details in the hypothetical case of discussion groups restricted
to only two and three persons. Putting a1 = a4 = .. = aL = 0, Eq. (4)
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Figure 2: Variation P+(t) as function of successive days with L = 6. The
initial value at t = 1 is P+(1) = 0.70. Long dashed line (1): a1 = 0, a2 =
1
2
,
a3 =
1
2
, a4 = a5 = a6 = 0 with P+F = 1. Heavy thick line (2): a1 = 0.2,
a2 = 0.3, a3 = 0.2, a4 = 0.2, a5 = 0.1 and a6 = 0 with P+F = 0.85. Other
line (3): a1 = a2 = a3 = a4 = 0.2, a5 = a6 = 0.1. There P+F = 0.74. Dashed
line (4): a1 = 0, a2 = 0.3, a3 = 0.7, a4 = a5 = a6 = 0 with P+F = 0.71.
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reduces to,
P+(t + 1) = a2P+(t)
2 (6)
+(1− a2){P+(t)
3 + 3P+(t)
2(1− P+(t))},
whose stable fixed points are still 0 and 1 with the unstable one lacated at,
P+F =
1
2(1− a2)
. (7)
For a2 = 0 (only three size groups) we recover P+F =
1
2
while it gets to
P+F = 1 already at a2 =
1
2
. It shows the existence of pair discussion has
a drastic effect on creating doubt that in turn produces a massive refusal
spreading. Few days are now enough to get a total reform rejection.
Keeping an initial P+(t) = 0.70 the time series become P+(t+ 1) = 0.64,
P+(t + 2) = 0.55, P+(t + 3) = 0.44, P+(t + 4) = 0.30, P+(t + 5) = 0.16,
P+(t + 6) = 0.05 before P+(t + 7) = 0.00. The reform supporters falling
down is extremely sharp as shown in Fig. (2). Within a bit more than two
days a majority of the people is already standing against the reform that
yet started with a seventy- percent support. Seven days latter the proposal
is completely out of any reach with not one single supporter. Considering
instead only thirty percent of pair discussion groups, the falling is weakened
but yet within sixteen days we have P+(t + 16) = PN0.00 (see Fig. 2).
Clearly an infinite number of combinations of the {ai} is possible. How-
ever the existence of these temporary local doubts which ultimately produces
a strong polarization towards social refusal is always preserved. At this stage
it is worth to stress that in real life situations not every person is open to
a mind change. Some fractions of the population will keep on their opinion
whatever happens. Including this effect in the model will not change quali-
tatively the results. It will make the polarization process not total with the
two stable fixed points shifted towards respectively larger and smaller values
than zero and one.
To give some real life illustrations of our model, we can cite events related
to the European Union which all came as a surprise. From the beginning of
its construction there have been never a large public debate in most of the
involved countries. The whole process came trough government decisions
tough most people always have seemed to agree on this construction. At the
same time European opponents have been systematically urging for public
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debates. Such a demand sounds like absurd knowing a majority of people
favor the European union. But anyhow most European governments have
been reluctant to held referendum on the issue.
At odd, several years ago French president Mitterand decides to run a
referendum to accept the Maastricht agreement [11]. While a large success of
the Yes was given for granted it indeed made it just a bit beyond the required
fifty percent. The more people were discussing, the less support there was for
the proposal. It is even possible to conjuncture that an additional two weeks
extension of the public debate would have make the No to win. The very
recent Irish No [4] which came as a blow to all analysts may obey the same
logic. The difference with the French case was certainly the weaker initial
support. Of course addition political reasons to the No were also active.
To conclude, even tough our model is clearly very crude it does demon-
strate the inherent polarization effect associated to the holding of democratic
debates towards social immobility. Moreover this process was shown to be de
facto anti-democratic since even in a perfect world it makes an initial minor-
ity refusal to almost systematically spread over in convincing very quickly the
whole population. The existence of natural random local temporary doubts
is instrumental in this phenomenon driven by the geometry of social life. As
on how to remedy this reversal phenomenon, the first hint is to avoid the dif-
fusion of the No via these localized temporary doubts. Direct and immediate
votes would address this task preserving the democratic expression of an un-
biased initial majority. But more thoughts and studies should be performed
before getting to a clear proposal scheme. The model may generalize to a
large spectrum of social, economical and political phenomena that involve
propagation effects. In particular it could shed a new light on both processes
of fear propagation and rumors spreading.
References
[1] R. D. Friedman and M. Friedman, The Tyranny of the Status Quo,
Harcourt Brace Company (1984)
[2] S. Moscovici, Silent majorities and loud minorities, Communication
Yearbook, 14. J. A. Anderson. Sage Publications Inc. (1990)
[3] S. Galam Les r/’eformes sont-elles impossibles ?, Le Monde/ 28 mars/
18-19 (2000)
10
[4] http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/europe/ Prodi tackles Irish
sceptics (2001)
[5] S. Galam, B. Chopard, A. Masselot and M. Droz, Eur. Phys. J. B 4,
529-531 (1998)
[6] M. Barth/’el/’emy and L. A. N. Amaral, Phys. Rev. Lett. 82, 3180-3183
(1999)
[7] S. Solomon, G. Weisbuch, L. de Arcangelis, N. Jan and D. Stauffer,
Physica A277 (1-2), 239-247 (2000)
[8] Gerard Weisbuch, Guillaume Deffuant, Frederic Amblard, Jean Pierre
Nadal, cond-mat/0111494
[9] T. C. Schelling Micromotives and Macrobehavior, New York, Norton
and Co. (1978)
[10] M. Granovetter, American Journal of Sociology 83, 1420-1443 (1978)
[11] M. Franklin, M. Marsh and L. McLaren Uncorking the Bottle: Popular
Opposition to European Unification in the Wake of Mastricht, Annual
meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association (1993)
[12] R. Pastor-Satorras and A. Vespignani, Phys. Rev. Lett. 86, 3200-3183
(2001)
11
